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I. INTRODUCTION 
John Dalberg-Acton famously proclaimed that, “[p]ower tends to 
corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”1 Former Illinois 
Governor Rod Blagojevich, acting under state law to appoint a 
replacement to fill a vacant seat in the United States Senate, infamously 
quipped that such a seat is “a fucking valuable thing, you just don’t give 
it away for nothing.”2 In Springfield, Illinois, in late 2008, Governor 
Blagojevich was John Dalberg-Acton’s word made flesh. The procedure 
followed by Illinois to fill a vacant Senate seat — to vest all of the 
power in the governor3 — is not only a policy filled with potential 
abuses and shortcomings, but also a policy followed by far too many 
states. Governors have acted under the color of similar laws numerous 
times over the past decade in ways that cast doubt on the legitimacy of 
government. It is time to end this policy. 
The seat in Illinois was not the only senatorial office vacated 
following the 2008 election. While Barack Obama and Joe Biden 
resigned from the Senate to serve as President and Vice President, 
respectively, two other senators left office to accept positions in 
Obama’s Cabinet.4 In total, since June 4, 2007, nine senators have left 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Political Science, 
Drew University, magna cum laude, 2008. I would like to thank Professor Alexander, for 
his tremendous help and wisdom; Drew Univ. Professors Romance & Mundo, for making 
me a better writer and student of politics; and my family, for their love and support. 
1 JOHN EMERICH EDWARD DALBERG-ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 364 
(1948).   
2 Complaint at 56, United States v. Blagojevich, 08 CR 888 (N.D. Ill. 2008), available 
at www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/pr1209_01a.pdf [hereinafter “Complaint”]. 
3 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2010). 
4 Obama was replaced by Roland Burris. Rick Pearson & Ray Long, Gov. Rod 
Blagojevich Picks Former Attorney General to Replace Obama, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 
31, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-blagojevich-burris-senate-31dec31 
,0,2666580.story. Ted Kaufman was appointed to Biden’s seat. Jeff Montgomery, Longtime 
Aide Ted Kaufman to Fill Biden’s Senate Seat, USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 2008, 
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office during the middle of their term.5 In all of these instances, state 
law has determined how the seat is to be filled. As highlighted by the 
Blagojevich scandal, these laws are far from perfect. 
On January 19, 2010, Scott Brown, a Republican from 
Massachusetts, won a special election to serve out the remainder of the 
late Edward “Ted” Kennedy’s senate term.6 His election had a national 
impact, as he became the forty-first Republican in the Senate, ending 
the Democrats’ filibuster-proof “super-majority.”7 For nearly a year, 
building off of the momentum of having a “super-majority,” the 
Democrats had been calling for major healthcare reform.8 With Brown’s 
election, pundits suddenly declared moot the months-long healthcare 
 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2008-11-24-minner-biden_N.htm. Hillary Clinton 
left her New York seat to serve as Secretary of State, and was replaced by Kristin 
Gillibrand. Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Picks Gillibrand for Senate 
Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2009/01/24/nyregion/24senator.html. Finally, Ken Salazar of Colorado resigned to serve as 
the Secretary of the Interior ande was replaced by Michael Bennet. Karen Crummy, Ritter 
Taps Bennet as Senator, DENVER POST, Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com 
/breakingnews/ci_11355396. 
5 See Crummy, supra note 4 (Salazar (CO)); Hakim & Confessore, supra note 4 
(Clinton (NY)); Montgomery, supra note 4 (Biden (DE)); Pearson & Long, supra note 4 
(Obama (IL). Further, Craig Thomas (WY) passed away on June 4, 2007, and was replaced 
by John Barrasso. Rita Healy & P.G. Sittenfeld, Wyoming’s New Senator, TIME, June 22, 
2007, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1636439,00.html. Next, Trent Lott 
(MS) resigned to work in the private sector, and Roger Wicker was appointed to fill his 
vacant seat. Adam Nossiter, Congressman Named to Fill Lott’s Senate Seat, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/01/washington/01senator.html. Mel 
Martinez (FL) also resigned from the Senate and was replaced by George LeMiuex. Adam 
C. Smith, Gov. Charlie Crist Places a Bet on Loyalty by Appointing George LeMieux, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 29, 2009, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/state/no-one-
was-a-safer-choice-than-george-lemieux-but-time-will-tell-if/1031984. Following the death 
of Edward “Ted” Kennedy (MA), Paul Kirk was temporarily appointed to the seat, before 
Scott Brown won a special election. Paul Kane & Karl Vick, Republican Brown Beats 
Coakley in Special Senate Election in Massachusetts, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/19/AR2010011904517. 
html. Finally, Sen. Robert Byrd (WV) died on June 28, 2010. Adam Clymer, Robert Byrd, A 
Pillar of the Senate, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2010/06/29/us/politics/29byrd.html. 
6 Kane & Vick, supra note 5. 
7 David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats May Seek to Push Health Bill 
Through House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/health 
/policy/19health.html. 
8 Robert Pear & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Says He Is Open to Altering Health Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/us/politics/06web-
health.html. On March 5, 2009, the forty-fifth day of his Administration, President Obama 
hosted a “healthcare summit.” Id.  
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debate, which had been one of the top stories of the year,9 as the 
Republicans could now prevent a bill from coming to a vote by 
blocking a motion for cloture.10 Mara Liasson, a National Public Radio 
correspondent, captured the general consensus following the election 
when she stated, “[w]ell, a lot has happened since [Brown won]. 
Obviously health care was about to pass. Everybody here at this table 
and [in Washington, D.C.] felt that way. No longer.”11 This drastic 
change on Capitol Hill occurred because of the vacancy in one Senate 
seat. It is apparent from this reaction that senators are important people, 
and that one vacancy can have a major impact on the national political 
landscape. Based on the number of senators that have left office early 
over the past few years, and the importance of the office, the time is ripe 
for state legislatures to reexamine the laws on the books, and to craft 
Senate succession laws that best encapsulate key public policy 
considerations. 
The uniform law proposed in this Note recognizes that Senate 
succession laws should seek to advance four goals: (1) placing a check 
on the governor’s power; (2) ensuring legitimacy in the process; (3) 
guaranteeing that a state is not underrepresented in the Senate for a 
prolonged period of time; and, (4) seeking a fair result. It is important to 
place a check on the governor’s power because the Framers founded the 
United States government on a system of checks and balances.12 Further, 
without placing a check on the governor’s power, a state is inviting the 
type of abuse that occurred in Illinois in 2008. Connected to this is the 
 
9 Top 10 Everything of 2009: The Divisive Debate Over Health Care Reform, TIME, 
Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/ 
0,28804,1945379_1944421_1944382,00.html. 
10
‘Special Report’ Panel on ‘Scott Brown Effect’ on Health Care Reform, FOX NEWS 
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,583661,00.html [hereinafter Scott 
Brown Effect]. 
11 Id. 
12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), available at http://www.constitution. 
org/fed/federa51.htm. In this paper, entitled “The Structure of Government Must Furnish the 
Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments,” Madison begins:  
To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the 
necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the 
Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior 
provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so 
contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent 
parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their 
proper places.  
Id. 
CRAMERCRAMER_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:37 PM 
2011 FAIRNESS IN U.S. SENATE SUCCESSION LAWS 447 
goal of ensuring that the electorate has faith in the legitimacy of the 
process. This not only applies to situations where illegal wrongdoing 
has occurred, but also to even the hint of a corrupting influence. Such 
legal, but questionable, appointments could include a governor 
appointing his daughter to the Senate, or a governor appointing his chief 
of staff to the office of Senator. When the governor is making an 
appointment, he or she is speaking in a situation where the voice of the 
public would normally be heard through election. Therefore, it is not 
only proper to allow more people to have a say in the process, but it is 
important that the people of the state have faith in that process. 
Avoiding underrepresentation in the Senate for a prolonged period 
of time is another issue that ties in doctrinally to the founding of this 
country. Thanks to the Connecticut Compromise, the Senate is the only 
body in the government where each state has an equal voice.13 With just 
100 members, every senator plays an important role in legislative 
action, as recently highlighted by the aftermath of the Scott Brown 
election.14 Because the federal government is set up to give each state 
equal power in the Senate, it is imperative that a state is fully 
represented in that legislative body. Thus, an appointee should fill a 
vacant Senate seat as quickly as reasonably possible. 
Finally, fairness can be achieved by making sure that the balance 
of power in the Senate does not shift solely because one senator is no 
longer in office and the governor appointing the replacement identifies 
with a different political party. As the election of Scott Brown makes 
clear, the balance of power in the Senate can be altered when just one 
seat “flips” from being held by one party to another. It would be 
inequitable for such a shift in the national political landscape to occur 
simply because one senator resigned or passed away, and the governor 
in his state appointed a replacement from a different political party. 
Party continuity is therefore a way to assure a fair result when 
appointing someone to serve out the remainder of another’s term. 
The law in forty states calls for the governor to have full discretion, 
without condition, to fill a vacancy in the Senate.15 These laws defy 
 
13 Alec MacGillis, Gangs of D.C., WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2009, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/08/07/AR2009080702045.html. 
14 Scott Brown Effect, supra note 10. 
15 ALA. CODE § 36-9-7 (LexisNexis 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-102 (West 2011); 
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 1-12-201 (West 2011); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7321 (West 2011); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.161 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-542 (West 2011); IDAHO 
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fundamental principles of fairness, legitimacy, and checks on power. 
Other states hold a special election to be held to fill the vacancy, but 
these laws leave the state underrepresented in the Senate for too long. 
The best solution is one that checks the governor’s power while also 
assuring a fair and just result not only for voters within the state, but for 
all Americans. 
This Note, therefore, proposes a law that draws from the various 
laws of the fifty states. Although the ultimate decision should be vested 
with the governor, he or she should choose from one of three candidates 
nominated by the state committee of the political party to which the 
former senator belonged at the time he or she left office. This proposed 
law would also have special stipulations for senators not registered to a 
party. The proposed legislation also assures that the balance of the 
Senate will not shift based on the political affiliation of the governor, 
while also foreclosing opportunities for corruption and assuring that the 
people of the state are not left without full representation in Washington 
for an extended period of time. 
Before states pass a new law, however, there must be a realization 
that the current system is flawed. Instead of balancing the key policy 
considerations set forth above, it appears that state legislatures have 
been comfortable with the quid pro quo of politics — to the victor goes 
the spoils. Recognizing the shortcomings of this policy will pave the 
way to reform. 
In 1881, President James A. Garfield was assassinated by Charles 
 
CODE ANN § 59-910 (West 2011); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2011); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 3-13-3-1 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN § 69.8 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-
318 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.200 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
18:1278 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 391 (2010); MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 
8-602 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 140 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
SERV. § 168.105 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204D.28 (West 2011); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.040 (West 2011); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 13-25-202 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-565 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.030 (LexisNexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661:5 (LexisNexis 
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-14 (LexisNexis 
2011); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-12 (West 
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-13-08 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3521.02 
(West 2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (West 2011)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-20 
(2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-101 (West 2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 204.002, 
204.003 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2621 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-
207 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.28.030 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 
3-10-3 (West 2011). 
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J. Guiteau, who was upset that the President did not give him a job in 
return for campaigning on Garfield’s behalf at the Republican National 
Convention.16 At the time, the common practice — dubbed the “spoils 
system” — was for the winning public official to give nearly all of the 
government jobs to loyal members of his party.17 Following Garfield’s 
assassination, Congress passed the Pendleton Act to reform the 
patronage system.18 Over the years, the law has been strengthened and 
reformed to the point where over ninety percent of government jobs are 
secure from one election to another.19 
Hopefully the Blagojevich scandal is the tipping point in the call to 
reform Senate succession laws, much like Garfield’s assassination led to 
the reform of civil service jobs. In both instances, the quid pro quo of 
the day is not in the best interest of the people. At present, state 
legislatures are either ignoring key policy considerations, or do not 
realize what they are doing by employing the laws that are currently on 
the books. Instead of giving governors so much power, it is necessary 
for state legislatures to balance the interests at stake, and to reform the 
law accordingly. 
 Part II of this Note examines the current state laws that are 
employed to determine how to fill a vacant Senate seat. Part III looks at 
the problems that arise when a state vests unchecked power in the 
governor, as is the current practice in forty states. Part IV highlights the 
potential pitfalls of calling for a special election to fill the vacancy. An 
alternate proposal is put forth in Part V of this Note, while the reality of 
how difficult it would be to implement such reform is addressed in Part 
VI. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF LAW 
The laws governing Senate succession can be separated into three 
groups. First, the law in forty states provides the governor with absolute 
 
16 Charles Guiteau Collection: GEORGETOWN U. LIBR., http://www.library.georgetown. 
edu/dept/speccoll/cl133.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
17 Andrew Jackson: Good, Evil & The Presidency, Special Features, The Spoils System, 
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kcet/andrewjackson/features/the_spoils_system.html (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2011) (noting that it was United States Senator William L. Marcy who first said, 
following the 1828 election of Andrew Jackson, that, “to the victor belongs the spoils[.]”). 
18 Pendleton Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (current version in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
19 Pendleton Act (1883), U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.our 
documents.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=48(last visited Mar. 11 2011). 
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authority to appoint a new senator in the event of a vacancy.20 These 
laws also require the governor to call for a special election within two 
years of that appointment.21 The second group consists of six states that 
take the opposite approach, vesting no power in the governor.22 Instead, 
these states require the vacancy to be filled by a special election.23 
Although there is no uniform requirement, states generally hold these 
elections three to four months after the seat is vacated.24 This leaves the 
final group, which consists of four states that have taken unique 
approaches to Senate succession laws. 
The first of these four states is Arizona, whose statute calls for the 
governor to appoint a replacement when a Senator vacates his or her 
seat prematurely.25 The power is qualified, however, by the requirement 
that the “appointee shall be of the same political party as the person 
vacating the office[.]”26 This law provides little guidance to the 
governor, and could potentially be an invitation for abuse. The 
foundation upon which the law rests is not faulty, but could be written 
more concisely. Three states have enacted laws that avoid such 
vagueness — Hawai’i, Utah, and Wyoming.27 
In the event of a vacancy in the Senate, Wyoming law calls for the 
state political party that the senator represented at the time of his or her 
election to nominate three potential replacements to the governor.28 The 
governor then has the sole power to appoint the replacement from this 
group.29 Once the governor names a replacement, a special election 
occurs within two years.30 In the event that the senator was not a 
registered member of a political party at the time of his or her election, 
the law calls for each party registered in the state to nominate one 
 
20 E.g.,N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011).  
21 Id. 
22 ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145 (2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §12-101 (West 2011); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §188.120 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-4-9 (West 2010); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-11-1 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §17.18 (West 2011). 
23 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145. 
24 Id. 
25 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-222 (LexisNexis 2011). 
26 Id. 
27 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1(LexisNexis 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502 
(West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (West 2011). 
28 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
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person.31 Any individual not registered with a political party may enter 
his or her name for consideration, provided a petition with 100 
signatures to the Wyoming Secretary of State accompanies their 
application.32 The governor is then presented with the names of all of the 
candidates, and is vested with the power to fill the vacancy from that 
list.33 
Utah and Hawai’i have similar laws. Utah law calls for the 
governor to choose from one of three candidates “nominated by the 
state central committee of the same political party as the prior 
officeholder.”34 Utah law does not, however, have a provision that 
governs how to fill a vacancy if the exiting senator was not registered 
with a political party. The law in Hawai’i is similar, providing that the 
governor should make an appointment “from a list of three prospective 
appointees submitted by the same political party as the prior 
incumbent.”35 In the event that the previous legislator was an 
independent, the law states that “the Governor shall appoint a person 
who is not and has not been, for at least six months immediately prior to 
the appointment, a member of any political party.”36 
III. THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE WHEN POWER IS VESTED 
SOLELY IN THE GOVERNOR 
A. Shifting the Balance of Power in the United States Senate 
Forty states vest the governor with the unchecked power to appoint 
a replacement to the United States Senate.37 Although these laws achieve 
 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502 (West 2010). 
35 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis 2011). 
36 Id. 
37 ALA. CODE § 36-9-7 (LexisNexis 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-102 (West 2011); 
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 1-12-201 (West 2011); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7321 (West 2011); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.161 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-542 (West 2011); IDAHO 
CODE ANN § 59-910 (West 2011); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2011); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 3-13-3-1 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN § 69.8 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-
318 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.200 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
18:1278 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 391 (2010); MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 
8-602 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 140 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
SERV. § 168.105 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204D.28 (West 2011); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.040 (West 2011); MONT. 
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the state’s goal of being fully represented in Washington for as long as 
possible, placing such great power in the hands of one elected official 
runs contrary to the goals of fairness, placing a check on power, and 
ensuring legitimacy. If the exiting senator and the current governor are 
members of different political parties, then it seems almost inevitable 
that the Senate seat will change party hands. In a legislative body that is 
limited to 100 members, such a transformation could shift the balance 
of power. In any given situation, a vacant senate seat could give rise to 
the breaking of a 50-50 deadlock, the elimination of a 51-49 majority, 
or the end of a “super-majority.” Needless to say, this is not the proper 
avenue by which to achieve a change in the power structure of the 
Senate. 
This concern is legitimate, especially considering the recent 
makeup of the Senate. On January 2, 2001, a day before the 107th 
Congress first convened, the Senate was evenly split with fifty 
Democrats and fifty Republicans.38 Two years later, when the 108th 
Congress met for the first time, the Republicans held a slim 51-48-1 
majority, with the lone independent, Senator James Jeffords (VT), 
caucusing with the Democrats.39 Further, the 110th Congress — which 
was in session from January 2007 through January 2009 — began with 
the Democrats holding onto a 49-49-2 “majority;”40 both independent 
 
CODE ANN. § 13-25-202 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-565 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.030 (LexisNexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661:5 (LexisNexis 
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-14 (LexisNexis 
2011); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-12 (West 
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-13-08 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3521.02 
(West 2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (West 2011)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-20 
(2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-101 (West 2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 204.002, 
204.003 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2621 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-
207 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.28.030 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 
3-10-3 (West 2011). 
38 Alan Fram, Power-Sharing Divides Evenly Split 107th, ABC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2001), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=122135&page=1 (noting that a series of events 
unfolded over the two years while the 107th Congress was in session, ultimately resulting in 
a Republican majority, 51-48-1). 
39 MILDRED L. AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21379, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 108TH 
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2004), available at, http://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
resources/pdf/RS21379.pdf; Brian Knowlton, Switch by Jeffords Would Give 51-to-49 
Majority to Democrats: Senator Set to Defect From the Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/24/news/24iht-jefford_ed3_.html. . 
40 MILDRED AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22555, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 110TH 
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2008), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
resources/pdf/RS22555.pdf. 
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Senators, Joseph Liebermann (CT) and Bernie Sanders (VT), caucused 
with the Democrats.41 Finally, during the 111th Congress the Democrats 
held the coveted 60-40 “super majority,” allowing them to prevent a 
filibuster if the interests of all of the Democrat Senators aligned.42 A 
year into the congressional term, however, the Democrats’ majority fell 
to 59-41, after Scott Brown, a Republican, won a special election in 
Massachusetts following the death of Senator Kennedy, a Democrat.43 
Therefore, in four of the past five sessions of Congress, the balance of 
power not only could have shifted if one senator were to leave office, 
but the death of a senator and the law used to fill his remaining term 
actually did impact the balance of power. 
During the 110th Congress, the Democrats missed an opportunity 
to gain an extra seat because of the law in place in Wyoming.44 The 
Democrats began the 110th Congress with a 49-49-2 “majority.” On 
June 4, 2007, Republican Senator Craig Thomas (WY) passed away 
after a long battle with leukemia.45 If Wyoming were one of the forty 
states that vests sole authority in appointing a replacement with the 
governor,46 it is likely that the Democrats would have gained an extra 
seat because Dave Freudenthal, a Democrat, was governor at the time.47 
However, as mentioned, Wyoming law prevents a political party from 
capitalizing on such an unfortunate situation.48 Thus, the Wyoming 
Republican Party presented Governor Freudenthal with a list of three 
nominees, and he selected John Barrasso from the list to serve as the 
state’s junior senator.49 
In the current era of politics, where tremendous emphasis is placed 
 
41 David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Address Their Own Rifts on Health 
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/16/health/policy 
/16health.html [hereinafter Democratic Rifts on Health Care]; Paul Kane & Shailagh 
Murray, Senate Democrats Allow Lieberman to Retain Key Chairmanship, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/18/ 
AR2008111800231.html. 
42 Monica Davey & Carl Hulse, Franken’s Win Bolsters Democratic Grip in Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/us/politics/01minnesota 
.html.  
43 Kane & Vick, supra note 5. 
44 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (West 2011). 
45 Rita Healy & P.G. Sittenfeld, Wyoming’s New Senator, TIME, June 22, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1636439,00.html. 
46 E.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011) . 
47 Healy & Sittenfeld, supra note 45. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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on which states are “blue” and which states are “red,” it is easy to think 
that the political climate of a state is defined by a color. As it turns out, 
the party affiliation of a state’s governor and two senators cannot easily 
be ascertained based on how a state voted in the last Presidential 
election. Currently, there are thirty-one senators who serve twenty-five 
states where the governor has a party affiliation that differs from their 
own.
50
 As such, if hypothetical Senator A from State One were to leave 
office tomorrow, there is nearly one out of three odds that the Governor 
of State One has a different political party affiliation than Senator A.51 A 
vast majority of states are ignoring the issue of fairness that arises in 
this situation. 
B. Unelected Governors 
While interests of legitimacy, fairness, and placing a check on 
power are already being ignored when a state gives the governor 
unchecked power to fill a senate vacancy, these interests are heightened 
when the governor is not actually elected to the state’s highest office. 
There are two different scenarios that could give rise to such a situation: 
(1) when the new governor was elected lieutenant governor and 
succeeded the former governor from that position; or, (2) if the state 
does not have a lieutenant governor’s office and the new executive was 
not elected statewide. The latter scenario is the more likely of the two to 
raise additional concerns about the appointment. 
i. Lieutenant Governors 
If a state has a lieutenant governor, the concern over the legitimacy 
of an appointment made by an unelected governor is mitigated. At the 
federal level, the vice president has ascended to the presidency on eight 
 
50 Compare Governor Roster 2011, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/GOVLIST.PDF, with Senators of the 112th Congress, U.S. 
SENATE, http://senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm (last visited Mar. 
13, 2011). 
51 It is important to note that it is “different party affiliation,” because it cannot be 
assumed that one is a Democrat, the other a Republican. For example, Connecticut’s 
Governor is a Republican, while one of its Senators, Richard Blumenthal, is a Democrat, 
and the other, Joseph Lieberman, an independent. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, supra note 50; 
U.S SENATE, supra note 50. Similarly, Senator Bernie Sanders from Vermont is an 
independent who serves alongside Senator Leahy, a Democrat, while Vermont is governed 
by a Democrat. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, supra note 50; U.S SENATE, supra note 50. 
Because the issue of senators without a party affiliation will be addressed later, this 
distinction is necessary. See infra Part V(B). 
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occasions following the death of the president, and once following a 
resignation.52 Fighting over the legitimacy of the Administration of a 
former vice president was John Tyler’s cross to bear.53 It is now a long 
established norm that a vice president or lieutenant governor can ascend 
to the executive office.54 
The most recent example of a lieutenant governor ascending to the 
office of governor, and then having the responsibility of appointing a 
senator, occurred in New York in 2009.55 After Governor Elliot 
Spitzer’s resignation following a sex scandal, David Paterson rose from 
lieutenant governor to governor.56 Paterson was then responsible, under 
New York law,57 for appointing a replacement for Senator Hillary 
Clinton, who resigned to serve as Secretary of State in the Obama 
Administration.58 Governor Paterson selected United States 
Representative Kristen Gillibrand to fill the vacancy.59 Concerns of the 
electorate losing faith in the system in this situation are mitigated 
because Paterson was elected to the lieutenant governor position with 
the understanding that he may one day have to exercise the powers of 
the governor. By implementing a law that calls for the governor’s 
successor to be voted into office at the statewide level, the New York 
Legislature found a way to protect the process.60 There are states, 
 
52 Vice President of the United States (President of the Senate), U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm#4 (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
53 John Tyler became the first Vice President to assume the Office of the President 
following the death of his predecessor (William Henry Harrison). John Tyler, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/johntyler (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
Dubbed “His Accidency,” it was unclear at the time whether it was proper for Tyler to 
assume the full powers of an elected President. Id.    
54 Id. 
55 Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Picks Gillibrand for Senate Seat, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/24/nyregion/24senator.html. 
56 Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Is Sworn In As Governor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/nyregion/17cnd-paterson.html. 
57 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011). 
58 Hakim & Confessore, supra note 55. 
59 Id. 
60 This process includes more than just exercising the appointment power when a seat in 
the United States Senate has been vacated. Governors sign legislation into law and make 
numerous appointments — for various boards or local judgeships — on a weekly basis. By 
having a lieutenant governor office, some states have assured the integrity of all of these 
acts. It should be noted, however, that when exercising the appointment power when a 
Senate seat is vacated, the governor is being asked to substitute his or her own opinion for 
the will of the electorate (as opposed to when the governor appoints a local judge). Thus, the 
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however, that have failed to make such a value judgment, and have thus 
exposed themselves to situations where the legitimacy of an unelected 
governor exercising the appointment power could be called into 
question. 
ii. States without a Lieutenant Governor Office 
There are currently seven states that do not have an office of 
lieutenant governor.61 These states instead call for the senate president, 
attorney general, or secretary of state to succeed the governor in the 
event that the governor vacates the office.62 If such an official were to 
rise to the office of governor and be charged with filling a vacant senate 
seat, unique issues would arise. 
The political scandal that rocked New Jersey in 2004 illustrates the 
potential problem. Following the resignation of Governor James 
McGreevey, New Jersey Senate President Richard Codey served as the 
acting governor for fifteen months.63 Had a United States Senate seat 
been vacated during that time, Governor Codey would have had 
unchecked power to appoint a replacement to serve the people of New 
Jersey.64 Governor Codey possessed such power despite the fact that the 
electorate in only one of New Jersey’s forty state senate districts voted 
him into office.65 Despite his high approval ratings as governor, the 
people of New Jersey, as a whole, never elected him to serve in any 
office, let alone the state’s highest executive office.66 Instead, essentially 
two and a half percent of the people had the opportunity to vote for him 
in his state senate election. Regardless of this discrepancy, New Jersey 
law would have authorized him to speak for the people of New Jersey 
with respect to the person they wished to serve them in Washington. 
 
concerns over legitimacy are necessarily heightened. 
61 These seven states are: Arizona, Maine, New Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. Roster of Lieutenant Governors/NLGA Members, NAT’L 
LIEUTENANT GOVERNORS ASS’N, , http://www.nlga.us/web-content/LtGovernors/LG_Roster 
.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
62 Id. 
63 No Special Election to Replace McGreevey, MSNBC (Sept. 15, 2004, 6:31PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6012950. 
64 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26 (West 2011). 
65 Districts by Number, NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ 
districts/districtnumbers.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
66 On January 31, 2005, Governor Codey enjoyed a seventy-six percent approval rating. 
Did Codey Back Out Too Soon?, THE STAR-LEDGER/EAGLETON-RUTGERS POLL (Feb. 7, 
2005), http://slerp.rutgers.edu/retrieve.php?id=152-2.  
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The concerns over legitimacy that were foreclosed by allowing an 
elected lieutenant governor like David Paterson to fill a vacancy 
reemerge when the governor appointing a replacement has not won a 
statewide election. 
New Jersey is no longer one of the seven states without an office of 
lieutenant governor. On November 8, 2005, exactly fifty-one weeks 
after Governor Codey took office from the embattled Governor 
McGreevey,67 the voters of New Jersey passed a state constitutional 
amendment creating the lieutenant governor office.68 In New Jersey, the 
people were able to safeguard the process by voting to have a statewide 
election for the governor’s successor. While suggesting that the 
remaining seven states add a lieutenant governor office is beyond the 
scope of this proposal, stripping one person of the absolute power to 
appoint a senator is another way to safeguard the process, as well as 
mitigate questions about the legitimacy of the appointment. 
C. Conflicts of Interest 
By endorsing the political quid pro quo and vesting the 
appointment power solely in one person’s hands, state legislatures have 
passively endorsed situations where the governor is clearly torn between 
self-interest and the interests of the state. This is not a situation unique 
in the appointment of a senator, as governors are asked to appoint 
people to numerous positions, from judges to members of a board or 
committee. However, in the situation of appointing a senator, the 
governor is substituting his or her own judgment in a situation where 
the electorate normally has the opportunity to speak. Twice in the past 
decade a governor, acting with unchecked power, has, it appears, been 
able to place his interests above that of the state. 
i. Florida Governor Charlie Crist’s Conundrum 
On December 2, 2008, Senator Mel Martinez (FL) announced that 
he would not seek reelection in November 2010.69 By May 12, 2009, 
Florida Governor Charlie Crist, widely considered a rising star in the 
Republican Party, announced that he would not run for reelection, 
 
67 No Special Election to Replace McGreevey, supra note 63. 
68 New Jersey Lieutenant Governor, EAGLETON INST. OF POLITICS AT RUTGERS U., 
http://www.njvoterinfo.org/lieutenantgov.php (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
69 Chris Cillizza, Mel Martinez to Retire, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2008, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/thefix/senate/mel-martinez-to-retire.html. 
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instead opting to seek Martinez’s seat in 2010.70 On August 7, 2009, 
Senator Martinez announced that he was resigning before the end of his 
term.71 Crist was then charged with appointing a replacement under 
Florida law.72 Clearly, there was a natural tension between doing what 
was in the best interests of the people of Florida and what Governor 
Crist needed to do to further his own political ambitions. In the end, 
Crist appointed a man he knew would warm the seat for him and would 
not seek reelection in 2010: his former chief of staff, George LeMieux.73 
With a political system built on placing a check on power,74 it 
seems unfathomable that an overwhelming majority of state legislatures 
would foster an environment where such conflicts of interest can occur. 
Yet, such a framework is in place as a result of laws in states like 
Florida, which ignore the interests of the citizens in believing in the 
legitimacy of the process, opting instead to allow the quid pro quo of 
state politics to rule the day. 
ii. Alaska 2002: Keeping it in the Family 
On November 5, 2002, United States Senator Frank Murkowski 
was elected Governor of Alaska.75 Pursuant to Alaska law, one of his 
very first tasks was selecting a replacement for his seat on Capitol Hill.76 
Governor Murkowski selected a former Anchorage District Attorney 
who had served two terms in the Alaska State House: his daughter, Lisa 
 
70 Damien Cave & Gary Fineout, Restless in Tallahassee, or With Eye on 2012, 
Governor Rolls Dice, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/05/13/us/13cristq.html. 
71 Aaron Deslatte & Josh Hafenbrack, Sen. Mel Martinez’s Exit Kicks Ball to Crist, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug 8, 2009, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local 
/breakingnews/orl-mel-martinez-resigns-080709,0,2817086.story. 
72 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.161 (West 2011). 
73 Josh Hafenbrack, Gov. Crist Picks George LeMieux to Replace Mel Martinez as 
Florida’s Senator, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.orlandosentinel.com 
/news/local/seminole/orl-crist-picks-sentator-replacement-martinez-0828,0,3403253.story? 
track=rss; Adam C. Smith, Gov. Charlie Crist Places a Bet on Loyalty by Appointing 
George LeMieux, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 29, 2009, http://www.tampabay.com 
/news/politics/state/no-one-was-a-safer-choice-than-george-lemieux-but-time-will-tell-
if/1031984. 
74 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), available at http://www.constitution.org 
/fed/federa51.htm. 
75 Jill Lawrence, Career Politician to Head Home State, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2002, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/2002-11-06-murkowski_x.htm. 
76 ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145 (20011). 
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Murkowski.77 Two years later, the people of Alaska voted Ballot 
Initiative #4 into law, which stripped the governor of such power, 
opting instead to call for a special election.78 It would appear the people 
of Alaska doubted the process by which Governor Murkowski made the 
appointment. By reforming the law through a ballot measure, Alaskans 
were able to establish a safeguard so that their interest in the legitimacy 
of the process would not be ignored again. 
The problem with Alaska’s Ballot Initiative #4 is that it is 
reactionary. Currently, forty states are prone to such potential conflicts 
of interest.79 In the same election where Alaskans voted Ballot Initiative 
#4 into law, they elected Lisa Murkowski to serve a full term on Capitol 
Hill.80 Alaskan voters (perhaps tacitly)81 approved of Governor Frank 
Murkowski’s appointee, but they disapproved of the process used to 
first seat her. 
D. The Power of Incumbency 
The laws in the forty states that provide the governor with the sole 
authority to fill a vacancy in the Senate require a special election to be 
called within two years of the appointment.82 Therefore, the governor’s 
appointee will not necessarily serve the duration of the term. Yet, as the 
2004 election in Alaska demonstrates, these senators may not be voted 
out of office merely because the electorate disapproves of the manner in 
 
77 Katharine Q. Seelye, New Alaska Governor Gives Daughter His Seat, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/21/us/new-alaska-governor-gives-
daughter-his-seat-in-senate.html. 
78 Alaska Election Results 2004, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2004, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/elections/2004/ak/; Al Grillo, Murkowski Wins 
Close Race for Alaska Senate Seat, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com 
/news/politicselections/vote2004/2004-11-02-ak-ussenate-battle_x.htm. 
79 E.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011). 
80 Grillo, supra note 78. 
81 It would be improper to conclude merely from the election results that the people of 
Alaska whole-heartedly endorsed the selection of Lisa Murkowski. First, it is important to 
note that Alaskans have consistently voted overwhelmingly Republican. In fact, at the time 
of the 2004 election, Alaska’s two U.S. Senate seats had been occupied by Republican 
lawmakers since 1981. U.S. Senators from Alaska, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/ 
pagelayout/senators/one_item_and_teasers/alaska.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). Second, 
the Murkowski “brand” was powerful and popular in Alaska. Frank Murkowski had served 
in the Senate since 1981 and had just been elected governor; his political capital could 
certainly carry over to his daughter. Id. Third, and tied into that second point, is the power 
of incumbency. See infra Part III(D).   
82 E.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011).  
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which they were appointed.83 The truth is that United States Senators 
enjoy an incredibly high retention rate, and the power of incumbency in 
an election is undeniable.84 The argument here is not that high retention 
rates themselves are bad, but that the decision made by the governor in 
this situation, even if later checked by the people through a special 
election, has long-lasting and powerful implications. Because of this, it 
is important to safeguard the process by which these senators are 
appointed. 
If incumbency were not such an advantage in an election, the need 
to safeguard the process used to fill vacancies would be mitigated, if not 
altogether mooted. The reality of Washington, however, is that, on 
average, seven out of eight senators up for re-election are sworn into 
office for another six-year term.85 There have been eleven bi-annual 
Senatorial elections since (and including) 1990, and the average rate of 
incumbency is an astounding eighty-six and a quarter percent.86 The 
lowest retention rate during that time came in 2006, when the 
Democrats retook control of the Senate.87 Still, senators were re-elected 
that year at a rate of seventy-nine percent.88 Even the “Republican 
Revolution” of 1994 resulted in a ninety-two percent senatorial 
retention rate.89 While it is true that forty states call for a special election 
after the governor has made his or her appointment, an appointed 
senator has an advantage on the ballot. 
The aforementioned Senator Kristen Gillibrand (NY), a Democrat, 
is a great example of the clout that incumbency carries. In only her 
second term as a member of the United States House of 
Representatives, Gillibrand would have been a long shot to fill the seat 
vacated by Hillary Clinton if there had been an open primary, especially 
considering her upstate roots and 100% rating from the National Rifle 
Association.90 New York law requires that a special election be called 
 
83 Grillo, supra note 78. 
84 Reelection Rates Over the Years, CENTER. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Mary Lu Carnevale, Paterson’s Choice of Gillibrand Touches Off Chain 
Reaction,WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/01/23/patersons-
choice-of-gillibrand-touches-off-chain-reaction/. 
CRAMERCRAMER_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:37 PM 
2011 FAIRNESS IN U.S. SENATE SUCCESSION LAWS 461 
within two years of an appointment,91 and it appeared early on that the 
newly minted senator would face a primary challenge from a member of 
the more liberal wing of the party. 
United States Representatives Steve Israel and Carolyn B. Maloney 
both originally stated that they intended to challenge Senator Gillibrand 
in a 2010 Democratic Primary.92 Representative Israel, however, 
abandoned his plan to run after President Obama called the 
Congressman, urging him not to challenge the sitting senator.93 In a 
similar move, Representative Maloney aborted her plans, recognizing 
the “long odds” she faced in defeating Senator Gillibrand.94 She made 
this decision despite the fact that at that time she was holding an early 
33-27 lead over Gillibrand in a poll of New York Democrats.95 As a 
result of her newfound status as an incumbent in the Senate, Gillibrand 
dodged a serious primary challenge.96 Governor Paterson’s decision 
clearly had a long-lasting impact. 
E. The Finality of the Decision 
In two separate instances, separated by four decades, voters have 
attempted to challenge a governor’s appointment to the Senate in court. 
Specifically, voters have challenged the constitutionality of state laws 
that vest the appointment power with the governor. The first challenge 
came in 1968, following the appointment made after the assassination of 
Senator Robert Kennedy,97 while the second came in 2009, after 
Governor Blagojevich appointed Roland Burris to fill the remainder of 
President Obama’s senatorial term.98 The common thread between the 
two judgments is that a decision made by the governor of a state that 
provides him or her with full discretion is unquestionably final. 
 
91 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011). 
92 Raymond Hernandez, Recognizing Long Odds, Maloney Drops Her Senate Bid, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/nyregion/08maloney.html. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Toplines - 2010 New York Democratic Primary for Senate- July 14, 2009, 
RASMUSSEN REP. (July 14, 2009), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content 
/politics/elections/election_2010/election_2010_state_toplines/new_york/toplines_2010_ne
w_york_democratic_primary_for_senate_july_14_2009. 
96 Former Congressman Harold Ford, Jr. also mulled a primary challenge, ultimately 
deciding against it. Michael Barbaro, Ford Decides Not to Run for Senate Seat, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/nyregion/02ford.html. 
97 Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
98 Judge v. Quinn, 623 F. Supp. 2d 933, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
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i. Judge v. Quinn 
Following then-Governor Rod Blagojevich’s appointment of 
Roland Burris to the Senate, a class consisting of Illinois voters brought 
legal action, seeking an emergency injunction.99 Blagojevich had made 
the appointment despite being indicted on federal charges of corruption 
after allegedly attempting to sell the open seat.100 The plaintiff-voters 
challenged the constitutionality of the state statute that governs how 
Senate vacancies are filled.101 Specifically, they believed the law 
violated the Seventeenth Amendment.102 
Despite the inferences of illegitimacy that arose following the 
appointment of Roland Burris, a federal district judge found no legal 
justification for blocking the appointment.103 The court held that 
“Illinois’ statutory scheme is reasonable; the fact that the circumstances 
of this particular appointment have become one of the subjects of a 
criminal indictment is constitutionally irrelevant.”104 Although the 
Constitution is silent as to selections made under a cloud of 
illegitimacy, state legislatures could reform their law to avoid such 
situations. Few states, however, have chosen to do so. 
ii. The United States Senate’s Failed Attempt to Block Burris’ 
Appointment 
Following his indictment on federal charges, Governor 
Blagojevich refused to resign from office.105 The calls for his resignation 
came quickly from those in both state and federal government.106 
 
99 Id. 
100 See Complaint, supra note 2 at 75-76. 
101 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2011); Quinn, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 934. 
102 Quinn, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 934The Seventeenth Amendment states:  
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have 
one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for 
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures … When 
vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive 
authority may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments 
until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII cl. 1, 2.  
103 Quinn, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 940. 
104 Id. 
105 Susan Saulny, Resignation is Rumored; Response is a Firm ‘No’, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
14, 2008, at A18, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/us/politics/15illinois.html. 
106 Politicians to Blago: Resign, Resign, Resign, NBC CHICAGO (Jan. 10, 2009, 7:58 
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Ultimately, the Illinois Senate was successful in impeaching the 
Governor by unanimous vote.107 However, he still managed to make his 
appointment to fill the Senate seat prior to impeachment.108 
In the time between the indictment and impeachment, Senator 
Harry Reid (NV), the Senate Majority Leader, wrote the Governor 
urging him to resign so that an appointment could be made in a more 
favorable political climate.109 Senator Reid also warned that if Governor 
Blagojevich were to appoint a replacement before leaving office, the 
Senate would prevent that appointee from taking office under the power 
vested in Congress by Article 1, Section 5, Clause 1 of the United States 
Constitution.110 This assertion of power, however, proved to be 
unfounded, and the Senate was unable to block the appointment.111 
iii. Valenti v. Rockefeller 
In 1968, a class of voters in New York challenged the 
constitutionality of a state law that called for the governor to make an 
appointment to fill a Senate vacancy, followed by a special election.112 
The plaintiff-voters in Valenti asserted that the law, which was applied 
following the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy on June 6, 
1968, violated the Seventeenth Amendment.113 Given the circumstances, 
the court interpreted the statute to mean that “[s]ince this vacancy arose 
less than 60 days prior to New York’s regular spring primary in an 
 
AM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local-beat/Cries-For-Governors-Resignation-Grow-
Louder.html. Elected officials calling for Governor Blagojevich’s resignation included: Tom 
Cross, Republican Leader of the Illinois House of Representatives; Jack D. Franks and John 
A Fritchey, Members of the Illinois House of Representatives; United States Senator Dick 
Durbin (IL); Illinois Lieutenant Governor Pat Quinn; Illinois Attorney General Lisa 
Madigan; and United States Representative Dan Manzullo (IL-16). Id. 
107 Rick Pearson & Ray Long, Senate Convicts Blagojevich, Making Him the 1st Illinois 
Governor to be Thrown Out of Office, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 30, 2009, at 1. 
108 Rick Pearson & Ray Long, Gov. Rod Blagojevich Picks Former Attorney General to 
Replace Obama, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 31, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune.com 
/news/local/chi-blagojevich-burris-senate-31dec31,0,2666580.story. 
109 Letter from Senator Harry Reid, U.S. Senate Majority Leader to Rod Blagojevich, 
Governor of Ill. (Dec. 10, 2008), available at http://democrats.senate.gov/pdfs 
/Letter%20to%20Governor%20Blagojevich.pdf. 
110 Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, 
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a 
Quorum to do Business…”). 
111 Monique Garcia & Jill Zuckman, Senate Lets Burris In, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 13, 
2009, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-burris-13-jan13,0,6205163.story. 
112 Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
113 Id. 
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even-numbered year, under New York Election Law § 296 the vacancy 
will be filled at the general election in the next even-numbered year, in 
this instance November, 1970.”114 The court went on to authorize the 
governor to make a temporary appointment, with that replacement 
serving until December 1, 1970.115 In Valenti, the court held that a law 
that delayed an election for twenty-nine months was not a violation of 
the Seventeenth Amendment.116 This same law, still followed today in 
New York, allowed Governor Paterson to appoint Senator Gillibrand to 
her position. 
The scandal in Illinois in 2008 is probably the most extreme 
example of an alleged abuse of power that one could imagine with 
regard to the appointment procedure, and still there was no legal 
remedy. Meanwhile, the timing of Senator Kennedy’s assassination was 
such that under New York law, his replacement was able to serve over 
forty percent of a full term before answering to the people of the state in 
an election.117 Combined with the power of incumbency and the 
numerous questions that could arise over the legitimacy of a governor’s 
unchecked action, it is evident that the law employed by forty states is 
not sound policy. 
IV. THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE WITH SPECIAL 
ELECTIONS: THE NEED FOR REPRESENTATION 
A. The Importance of Full Representation in the United States 
Senate 
Six states call for a special election to be held in the event a Senate 
seat is vacated.118 The length of time that passes between the date the 
seat is vacated and the date of the election varies based on the particular 
state. Oklahoma and Wisconsin law provide for the shortest possible 
length of time — thirty and sixty-two days, respectively.119 These time-
frames, however, can easily balloon to eighty or seventy-seven days, 
depending on factors like when the secretary of state calls for the 
 
114 Id. at 853. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 858. 
118 ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145 (2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §12-101 (West 2011); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §188.120 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-4-9 (West 2010); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-11-1 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §17.18 (West 2011). 
119 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 12-101; WIS. STAT. ANN. §8.50(2)(a).  
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election.120 After surveying the current law in the six states, it is 
reasonable to conclude that a state that calls for a special election to fill 
a Senate vacancy will be underrepresented on Capitol Hill for three to 
four months, if not longer. Given the great power that a senator 
possesses, a state speaking with half of its voice in the Upper House for 
such a prolonged period is unacceptable. 
United States Senators are important people. They have unique 
powers and responsibilities that Members of the House of 
Representatives do not posses.121 The Senate is also the only place in 
government where each state has equal representation, regardless of 
population.122 It also has fewer members, and as such, each senator’s 
vote carries more weight. 
While not an exhaustive list, there are four unique powers that 
demonstrate the difference between senators and representatives. First, 
under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution, two-thirds of 
the Senate must approve any treaty into which the President wishes to 
enter.123 Second, the same section of the Constitution calls on the Senate 
to confirm the appointments of members of the Cabinet, federal judges, 
Ambassadors, and other officials.124 Third, pursuant to Article I, Section 
3, the Senate tries all impeachment proceedings brought against the 
President, Vice President, and all other civil officers of the United 
States.125 Finally, under Senate Rule 22, senators have the power of the 
 
120 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 §§ 12-101, 103; WIS. STAT. ANN. §17.18. 
121 Powers & Procedure, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history 
/one_item_and_teasers/powers.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
122 MacGillis, supra note 13. 
123 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution states: 
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; 
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of 
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts 
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
Id. 
124 Id.   
125 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“[T]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments .... [but] no person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds 
of the Members present.”).  
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filibuster.126 This weapon in a senator’s procedural arsenal provides the 
legislator with the opportunity to block a vote on a bill by refusing to 
stop a debate on the Senate floor.127 
Aside from these unique powers vested in senators, one of the 
greatest powers a senator possesses stems from the Connecticut 
Compromise. There are only 100 senators, therefore the vote of one 
senator represents one percent of the final tally, while the vote of a 
representative equates to less than one quarter of one percent of the 
House’s final vote. More importantly, the United States Senate is the 
only legislative body in the country that is allowed to violate the 
principle of “one-person, one-vote,” as necessitated by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.128 All states are equal 
in the Senate regardless of size; while senators from Wyoming and 
California both represent half of their state’s vote in the Senate, there is 
an obvious discrepancy in the number of people each lawmaker 
represents. Because the Senate treats all states equally, there is no 
excuse for a state to be under-represented for three to four months (over 
five percent of a senatorial term). 
i. Minnesota 2008-2009 
This desire to be fully represented in the Senate was recently 
captured — albeit in a different way — in Minnesota. In the November 
2008 general election, incumbent Senator Norm Coleman and 
challenger Al Franken were locked in a contested election until the end 
of June 2009, leaving the state of Minnesota without its second senator 
for six months.129 By mid-May, six weeks before Senator Coleman 
 
126 Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
127 Id. Sen. Huey Long (LA) once spent fifteen hours on the floor of the Senate. His 
“debate” included recitations of Shakespeare and the reading of recipes for “pot-likkers.” 
Sen. J. Strom Thurmond (SC), however, holds the record for the longest filibuster. He set 
the record when he spoke out against the Civil Rights Act of 1957 for twenty-four hours and 
eighteen minutes. Id.   
128 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (holding 
unconstitutional a plan where the districts for the lower body of the state legislature were 
drawn according to population and the upper body districts drawn geographically-
proportionately); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political 
equality from the Declaration of Independence,to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the 
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing -- one person, 
one vote.”). 
129 Pat Doyle, At Last, a Second Senator for Minnesota, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-
St. Paul), July 1, 2009 http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/senate/49520987.html. 
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finally ended his legal challenge, fifty-four percent of Minnesotans 
hoped that Coleman would concede, allowing for the certification of Al 
Franken as the new Junior Senator from Minnesota.130 The poll numbers 
are notable because Franken received only forty-two percent of the vote 
in the election.131 The poll captures the dissatisfaction Minnesotans felt 
at being underrepresented in the Senate for one-twelfth of a term. 
While six months may seem like a trivial amount of time, the 
dispute left Minnesota with just one senator during some of the most 
trying economic times since the Great Depression.132 On February 17, 
2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, also known as the “Economic Stimulus Bill.”133 One 
of the most important pieces of legislation during the Obama 
Administration to date, it was passed just six weeks after the 111th 
Congress commenced. The Senate approved the Act on Monday, 
February 9, 2009, a mere thirty-seven days after the congressional 
session began.134 
While far from a perfect analogy, the speed in which the Senate 
was able to pass major legislation is worth noting. Had Minnesota’s seat 
simply been vacated on January 3, 2009, the day the 111th Congress 
began, under no state law that calls for a special election would a 
senator be seated in time for the vote. On the other hand, under a law 
that allows the governor to make an appointment, such a selection could 
have been made. Even under Wyoming law, which calls for the state 
political party to make nominations to the governor,135 the vacancy 
would have been filled in a timely manner. In fact, such efficiency has 
occurred. In the aforementioned application of the Wyoming law 
 
130 54% in Minnesota Say Coleman Should Concede Senate Race to Franken, 
RASMUSSEN REP. (May 19, 2009), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content 
/politics/general_state_surveys/minnesota/54_in_minnesota_say_coleman_should_concede_
senate_race_to_franken. 
131 Kevin Duchschere, Curt Brown & Pam Louwagie, Recount: The Franken-Coleman 
Brawl Drags On, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 6, 2008, 
http://www.startribune.com/politics/recount/33900844.html. 
132 See generally Bruce Bartlett, The Great Depression and The Great Recession, 
FORBES (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/29/depression-recession-gdp-imf-
milton-friedman-opinions-columnists-bruce-bartlett.html. 
133 Michael A. Fletcher, Obama Leaves D.C. to Sign Stimulus Bill, WASH. POST, Feb. 
18, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR20090217 
00221.html. 
134 David M. Herszenhorn, By Slim Margin, Senate Advances Stimulus Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/washington/10stimulus.html. 
135 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (West 2011). 
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following the death of Senator Thomas, the governor named his 
replacement just eighteen days after the seat was vacated.136 In the 
present hypothetical, where the seat is vacated on January 3 and the 
Senate votes on a bill on February 9, such a law would assure that the 
important vote would not be missed, while also safeguarding the 
procedures used to fill the vacancy. 
While it is true that the Minnesota controversy was the result of a 
contested election, as opposed to a vacated seat, this situation illustrates 
the importance of being fully represented on Capitol Hill. Although no 
state law used to fill a vacancy would leave a state underrepresented for 
six months, a three to four month vacancy can be expected if the state 
selects a replacement through special election.137 State legislators in the 
six states that call for a special election have addressed the goal of 
maintaining legitimacy in the process, and placing a check on power.138 
In doing so, however, they have failed to recognize the goal of being 
underrepresented in Washington for as short of a time as possible. 
ii. Massachusetts 2009 
These concerns of underrepresentation were recently raised in 
Massachusetts following the death of Senator Kennedy, a Democrat, on 
August 25, 2009, after a long bout with brain cancer.139 In a twist of 
irony, Senator Kennedy, a man who had made universal healthcare the 
primary cause of his decades-long public career, passed away in the 
midst of the most meaningful legislative progress on the issue.140 
Recognizing his own mortality, Senator Kennedy lobbied just five days 
before his death for a change in the Massachusetts law governing Senate 
succession.141 The law at the time called for a special election 145 to 160 
days following the date of a vacancy.142 Kennedy, who served the people 
 
136 Healy & Sittenfeld, supra note 45. 
137 ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145 (2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §12-101 (West 2011); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §188.120 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-4-9 (West 2010); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-11-1 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §17.18 (West 2011). 
138 Id. 
139 John M. Broder, Social Causes Defined Kennedy, Even at the End of a 46-Year 
Career in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
08/27/us/politics/27kennedy.html. 
140 See Frank Phillips, Kennedy, Looking Ahead, Urges a Quick Filling of Senate Seat, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20, 2009, at 1. 
141 Id. 
142 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 54, § 140(a) (West 2011); Id. 
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of Massachusetts for forty-seven years in the Senate,143 realized this law 
needed to be changed.144 
Nearly a month after Senator Kennedy’s death, on September 24, 
2009, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick signed a bill changing 
state law to permit the governor to appoint a replacement before the 
special election.145 Later that day, he filled the vacancy in accordance 
with that new law, appointing Paul Kirk,a Junior Senator from 
Massachusetts.146 At a press conference introducing Kirk as his 
appointee, Governor Patrick stated that Kirk “will not seek the open seat 
in the special election coming up in January. But for the next few 
months, he will carry on the work and the focus of Senator Kennedy, 
mindful of his mission, and his values, and his love of Massachusetts.”147 
There are two important takeaways from that statement. First, Patrick 
was not seeking to appoint a long-term replacement; rather, he 
delegated that matter to the people of Massachusetts in the January 2010 
special election. Second, Kirk was to continue fighting for the causes of 
Kennedy’s life. The undertone of this statement was clearly that having 
two senators in Washington best serves the interests of the people of 
Massachusetts. Patrick also realized the importance of party symmetry 
when naming a replacement. Full representation in the Upper House is 
essential, and to go for a prolonged period with a vacant seat — even 
for a few months — is not sound policy. 
B. The Potential for a Contested Special Election 
Another danger in requiring a vacancy to be filled through special 
election is the potential that the special election could be contested. If a 
recount or lengthy court battle ensues, the length of time the people of a 
state are represented by just one senator could double or triple. Such a 
situation would aggregate the pitfalls discussed in Part IV(A), supra, by 
increasing the time of underrepresentation. 
Take, for example, a combination of two previously mentioned 
scenarios. Minnesotans cast their ballots for the 2008 senatorial race on 
 
143 Martin F. Nolan, Kennedy Dead at 77, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/08/26/kennedy_dead_at_77. 
144 Phillips, supra note 140. 
145 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 54, § 140; Paul Kirk to Fill Kennedy’s Senate Seat, CNN 
(Sept. 24, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-24/politics/kennedy.replacement_1_ 
interim-senator-vicki-kennedy-senate-seat?_s=PM:POLITICS.  
146 Paul Kirk to Fill Kennedy’s Senate Seat, supra note 145. 
147 Id. 
CRAMER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:37 PM 
470 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 35:2 
November 4, 2008. Due to the contested election, Al Franken was not 
declared the winner until July 1, 2009, nearly eight months later.148 If 
this had been a special election, as was the case in Massachusetts 
following the death of Sen. Kennedy, where the seat was vacated three 
to four months prior to Election Day, the people of Minnesota could 
have been represented by only one senator for over a year. 
 Assume for example that a United States Senator serving the 
people of Oklahoma vacates his or her seat. Under Oklahoma law, this 
vacancy would be filled in fifty to seventy days;149 with the fifty days 
representing the quickest possible turnaround for any of the six states 
that call for a special election. Were a contested election of the 
magnitude that unfolded in Minnesota in 2008-09 to occur, that seat 
would remain vacant for ten to eleven months. These hypothetical 
situations demonstrate that some states have sacrificed the goal of full 
representation to satisfy goals of checking the governor’s power, 
ensuring legitimacy in the process, and having a fair result. The law 
proposed in this Note demonstrates that such a sacrifice is unnecessary, 
and all four goals are attainable. 
V. A PROPOSED UNIFORM LAW 
A. The Proposal 
There is undoubtedly something to be learned from all of the state 
laws mentioned thus far. While none of them, standing alone, is without 
fault, they all address at least one of the concerns discussed in this Note 
regarding a Senate succession law. The forty states that vest the 
governor with the power of appointment recognize that going for a 
prolonged period of time without full representation in the Senate is not 
in the state’s best interest. The six states that call for a special election 
realize that the people of the state should ultimately decide who 
represents them on Capitol Hill, assuring that the people have faith in 
the system. Finally, the laws in Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, and Hawai’i 
recognize the national interest in assuring that the balance of power in 
the Senate does not shift as the result of a senator’s resignation or death, 
while at the same time placing a check on the governor’s power.150 
 
148 Doyle, supra note 129. 
149 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 26 §§ 12-101, 103 (West 2011). 
150 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-222 (LexisNexis 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 
(LexisNexis 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2) (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-
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The proposed law herein takes into account the four main policy 
considerations that should be balanced when crafting such a law. Those 
four goals are: (1) placing a check on power; (2) ensuring legitimacy in 
the process; (3) avoiding underrepresentation in the Senate for a 
prolonged period of time; and, (4) fairness. While a majority of current 
state laws account for one or two of these goals, this proposal accounts 
for all four. 
With those goals in mind, there are five main features to the 
proposed uniform law: (1) assuming the exiting senator is a registered 
member of a political party, the governor has the power to make a 
temporary appointment, but he or she must choose from a list of three 
candidates supplied by the state political party committee of the exiting 
senator; (2) if the exiting senator is not a member of a political party, 
the state senate should meet to provide three names to the governor for 
appointment; (3) neither of these lists can include the governor, as he or 
she cannot appoint him- or herself to the seat; (4) the list of candidates 
must be submitted to the governor within fifteen days of the vacancy, 
and the governor must then make a decision within fifteen days of 
receiving the nominees, meaning that the seat will not be vacant for 
more than a month; and, (5) a special election will also be called to fill 
the remainder of the term, provided that more than thirty months remain 
in the term (if less than twenty-eight months remain, the governor’s 
appointee will serve out the balance of the term).151 
The interest of being fully represented on Capitol Hill is addressed 
by assuring that the seat remains vacant for no less than thirty days. The 
interests in fairness and placing a check on the governor’s power are 
dealt with by requiring the executive committee of the state political 
party of which the exiting senator was a member to nominate three 
candidates for the governor’s consideration. Finally, the issue of 
legitimacy in the process is tackled by having more people involved in 
the selection. The following is a uniform law that encapsulates these 
 
18-111(a)(i) (West 2011). 
151 At first blush, allowing an appointee to serve for so long without answering to the 
electorate might appear to be in direct contrast with what was previously stated in regard to 
the Valenti decision, where New York law called for a similar waiting period after Robert 
Kennedy’s death. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The 
difference, however, is that in New York the governor was the sole decision maker. N.Y. 
PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011). Under this Note’s proposal, the need for the 
electorate to check that decision in a timely manner is mitigated by involving more people 
in the appointment process.  
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policy considerations: 
If a vacancy should occur in the office of United States Senator, it 
shall be filled by special election on the day of the next general 
election in an even-numbered year, provided that the vacancy 
occurred ninety (90) days prior to said election day. If the vacancy 
occurred within ninety (90) days of the next general election in an 
even-numbered year, then a special election should be called on the 
first Tuesday following the first Monday of the next November in an 
odd-numbered year. If, however, the vacancy occurred within ninety 
(90) days of the next general election in an even-numbered year and 
less than twenty-eight (28) months remain in the term of the vacated 
United States Senate seat, no special election shall be called. Under 
any of the above scenarios, the governor shall be vested with the 
power to appoint a qualified candidate to the office of United States 
Senate, doing so no more than thirty (30) days after the day of the 
vacancy. To facilitate the governor’s appointment, the chairman of 
the state political party committee of which the previous incumbent 
was a registered member shall meet with members of the state 
political party’s board, and they shall nominate three (3) qualified 
candidates for the office of United States Senator, and submit that 
list to the governor within fifteen (15) days of the vacancy. The party 
affiliation of the incumbent shall be determined solely based on what 
the previous incumbent had declared on his or her voter registration 
card. No other circumstances shall be taken into consideration in 
determining the former Senator’s political party affiliation. The 
Governor will then be charged with appointing a United States 
Senator from the list of the three candidates submitted to the 
Governor’s Office. In the event that the incumbent was not affiliated 
with any political party registered in the state, the state senate shall 
be charged with fulfilling the same duties as would otherwise be 
required of the state political party committee with whom the 
incumbent had been registered. The state senate, meeting as a whole, 
shall nominate three (3) qualified candidates for the office of United 
States Senator, and the governor shall fill the vacancy by appointing 
one of those three nominated candidates to the office of United 
States Senator within thirty (30) days of the date the seat was 
vacated. The state senate shall be charged with creating and 
enforcing the appropriate legislation governing the procedure in 
which the state senate shall meet as a whole and nominate the three 
candidates. Under no circumstances shall the governor be allowed to 
appoint him- or herself to the vacated United States Senate seat. 
B. The Differences between the Proposal and Current State 
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Laws 
The proposed uniform legislation adopts more from the laws of 
Utah, Wyoming, and Hawai’i, than from any of the other states.152 While 
the proposal calls for a special election after the governor has made an 
appointment, just like the laws governing Senate succession in the first 
group of forty states,153 it also calls for a check on the power the 
governor possesses in selecting an appointment. That said, the proposal 
is not identical to the law of any state. 
i. Utah 
The Senate succession law in Utah reads, in part, that “[t]he 
governor shall appoint a person to serve as U.S. senator until the 
vacancy is filled by election from one of three persons nominated by the 
state central committee of the same political party as the prior 
officeholder.”154 The major pitfall of this law is that it does not take into 
account the possibility that the people of Utah will elect an independent 
to the Senate. Relatedly, the law does not identify how the former 
senator’s party affiliation will be determined. It is also possible that, 
once in office, a senator will leave his or her political party and then 
 
152 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22-18-111(a)(i). 
153 ALA. CODE § 36-9-7 (LexisNexis 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-102 (West 2011); 
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 1-12-201 (West 2011); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7321 (West 2011); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.161 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-542 (West 2011); IDAHO 
CODE ANN § 59-910 (West 2011); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2011); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 3-13-3-1 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN § 69.8 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-
318 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.200 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
18:1278 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 391 (2010); MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 
8-602 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 140 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
SERV. § 168.105 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204D.28 (West 2011); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.040 (West 2011); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 13-25-202 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-565 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.030 (LexisNexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661:5 (LexisNexis 
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-14 (LexisNexis 
2011); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-12 (West 
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-13-08 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3521.02 
(West 2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (West 2011)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-20 
(2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-101 (West 2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 204.002, 
204.003 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2621 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-
207 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.28.030 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 
3-10-3 (West 2011). 
154 UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2)(b). 
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either serve as an independent, or join a different party. Utah’s law fails 
to foresee any of these situations. 
ii. Wyoming 
The proposal more or less mirrors Wyoming’s law as it pertains to 
how to fill a seat vacated by a senator registered with a political party.155 
While the Wyoming law also fails to state how the party affiliation of 
the former senator will be determined, this is a minor discrepancy. The 
biggest problem with the law in Wyoming is the way in which it 
instructs the governor to appoint a replacement in the event the former 
senator was not registered with a political party. 
The governing law in Wyoming states that in the event the former 
senator was an independent: 
[all of the] state central [party] committees [registered with the 
Secretary of State] shall submit to the governor, within fifteen (15) 
days after notice of the vacancy, the name of one (1) person qualified 
to fill the vacancy. The governor shall also cause to be published in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the state notice of the vacancy in 
office. Qualified persons who do not belong to a party may, within 
fifteen (15) days after publication of the vacancy in office, submit a 
petition signed by one hundred (100) registered voters, seeking 
consideration for appointment to the office.156 
Although the law does successfully place a check on the 
governor’s power, more could be done to ensure legitimacy in the 
process. Realistically, the governor will care about one nomination and 
one nomination only: that of his or her own political party. As a result, 
the law runs the risk of falling into the same traps as the current law in 
forty states, by giving the governor full discretion to appoint a 
replacement.157 
Under this proposed law, having the state senate nominate three 
candidates for the governor’s consideration mitigates this potential 
pitfall. Although there is no perfect way to deal with independents, the 
proposed law would provide more legitimacy to the process by allowing 
dozens of elected officials to influence the decision, as opposed to one 
elected official and his or her political party. This proposal places a 
check on the governor’s power in a way that would reinforce legitimacy 
 
155 See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i). 
156 Id. 
157 E.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011). 
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in the process where the Wyoming law falls short. 
iii. Hawai’i 
Once again, the biggest difference between the proposal and the 
governing law in Hawai’i is the way in which a seat is filled when 
vacated by an independent.158 Hawai’i law provides: “[i]f the prior 
incumbent was not a member of any political party, the governor shall 
appoint a person who is not and has not been, for at least six months 
immediately prior to the appointment, a member of any political 
party.”159 Although it is commendable that the Hawaiian legislature has 
recognized the possibility of such a scenario, the law falls short of being 
the ideal way to govern the situation. 
The first problem with the law is the way in which it improperly 
lumps all independents together. While not every Democrat or 
Republican will be an ideological copy of another Democrat or 
Republican, they generally share common core values. Although there 
are pro-choice Republicans,160 and there are Democrats endorsed by the 
National Rifle Association,161 as a general principle a voter will be able 
to draw many correct conclusions on the politician’s beliefs based on 
that politician’s political party affiliation. In the 110th Congress, which 
was in session from January 2007 through January 2009, Democrat 
Senators voted along party lines on eighty-seven and a half percent of 
the issues, while Republican Senators were in line with their party on 
just over seventy-seven percent of the votes.162 Senator Olympia Snowe 
(ME), a Republican, displayed the least loyalty to her party, but still 
 
158 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis 2011). 
159 Id. 
160 Current pro-choice Republicans in the Senate include Scott Brown (MA), Susan 
Collins (ME), and Olympia Snowe (ME). John Amick, Brown Advocates a Big Tent GOP, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/01/brown-advocates-
a-big-tent-gop.html; Susan Collins on Abortion, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues. 
org/social/Susan_Collins_Abortion.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011); Olympia Snowe on 
Abortion, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/social/Olympia_Snowe_Abortion.htm 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
161 In the 2010 midterm elections, the NRA endorsed the Democrat in fifty-eight 
contested elections for seats in the House of Representatives. Ben Pershing, Pro-gun 
Democrats Win Endorsements from NRA, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/06/AR2010100606329. 
html. 
162 See The U.S. Congress Votes Database, WASH. POST (2009), 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/110/senate/party-voters [hereinafter U.S. 
Congress Votes]. 
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toed the party line on sixty-four and a half percent of the votes.163 
Based on these numbers, it is reasonable to conclude that a senator 
from one of the two major political parties will be in agreement with the 
party on eight or nine of every ten votes. This ideological uniformity 
cannot be assured among members of the public who are not registered 
to a political party. Choosing not to be registered Democrat or 
Republican does not mean that a person is a member of a distinct third 
party with unified beliefs. There are many reasons why a person elects 
to be independent, and appointing an unregistered person to fill the 
vacancy fails to assure that the balance of power in the Senate will not 
shift. In fact, Senators Lieberman (CT) and Sanders (VT), both 
independents, voted with the Democrats on roughly eighty-seven 
percent and ninety-four and a half percent of the issues, respectively.164 
These two Senators have elected to affiliate with Democrats by 
caucusing with the party, but they have chosen not to be registered 
members. Despite this, these two senators have displayed more loyalty, 
through their votes, to the Democratic Party than the average 
Republican shows to the GOP.165 
Under the proposed law, which would call for the state senate to 
nominate three candidates, there admittedly could still be an ideological 
shift in the Senate. That is to say, if, hypothetically, Senator Sanders 
were to leave office and the Vermont Senate was under Republican 
control, it would be safe to assume that the state senate would not 
nominate someone who would vote with the Democrats on roughly 
ninety-four and a half percent of the issues.166 At the same time, under 
this proposed law, if Senator Sanders were that devoted to the 
Democratic Party he could register as a Democrat and be assured a 
Democrat would be appointed to his seat if he were to leave office. By 
not being a registered Democrat, however, Senator Sanders has assumed 
a certain risk. Although it is possible that this proposal will still give 
rise to an ideological shift in the Senate, this raises the second major 
problem with the governing law in Hawai’i: if the former senator was 
an independent, the governor is once again the sole decision maker, 
albeit with the qualification that he or she not allow the appointment of 
 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. (showing 86.9% (Lieberman) and 94.6% (Sanders), compared with 77.8% for the 
average Republican). 
166 Id. 
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a Democrat or Republican.167 Under the law of Hawai’i, this situation 
once again opens the door for the potential abuses of power discussed in 
Part III, supra. 
There is no perfect answer as to how a seat should be filled when 
vacated by an independent, and there will inevitably be shortfalls in the 
law. Policy decisions can, however, be made. In this situation, the 
proposed law places a greater premium on checking the governor’s 
power, rather than attempting to assure political ideology replication. 
Further, as evidenced by the voting records of Senators Sanders and 
Lieberman, attempting to equate one independent with another is a 
faulty premise from the beginning. Therefore, the best answer is to 
address a policy concern that is redressable, which in this case is placing 
a check on the governor’s power of appointment by bringing the state 
senate into the process. 
C. Party Identification 
Unlike any law currently employed by a state, the proposed law 
establishes a way in which a senator’s party affiliation will be 
identified. Such a measure is necessary because there are senators who 
might be independent, but caucus with a political party, and that 
political party might seek to have control over filling that senator’s 
vacated seat. It is also possible for a senator to change political party 
affiliation while in office. Under the proposed law, the burden would be 
on the senator to change his or her voter registration card to reflect 
which political party he or she represents. It is a simple and definitive 
way to address the issue. 
i. True Independents: Lieberman and Sanders 
Senators Lieberman and Sanders are true independents. They ran 
as independents in their respective elections and they are not currently 
registered as a member of a political party.168 Under my proposal, in the 
event that either of these senators were to leave office, the state senate 
 
167 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis 2011). 
168 Democrats Back Lamont; Lieberman Files for Independent Run, FOX NEWS (Aug. 9, 
2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,207516,00.html (it is true that Lieberman was 
the Democratic nominee for Vice President in 2000, and ran an unsuccessful primary 
campaign for President in 2004. That said, since 2006, he has not been registered with a 
political party); Independent Sanders Elected to Senate; Democrat Welch Beats Rainville, 
USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2006 
/VT/VT.htm. 
CRAMER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:37 PM 
478 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 35:2 
would be charged with nominating three candidates to the governor. 
The fact that both Senators Lieberman and Sanders caucus with the 
Democrats is irrelevant.169 Rather, the burden will be on the sitting 
senator to assure that his or her successor shares similar political views 
by properly identifying him- or herself on a voter registration card. No 
other state law adequately addresses how the politician’s party 
affiliation will be determined.170 
ii. A Change of Heart: The Arlen Specter Situation 
On April 28, 2009, Senator Arlen Specter (PA) surprised many by 
announcing that, after twenty-eight years in office, he was leaving the 
Republican Party and would run for reelection as a Democrat in 2010.171 
Although not the most conservative of Republicans,172 the Senator had 
sought the Republican nomination for President in 1996,173 so his 
announcement still came as a surprise.174 Although Pennsylvania law 
calls for the governor to have unchecked power in appointing a 
replacement,175 a situation like this would present real consequences 
under Wyoming and Hawai’i law,176 as well as under this Note’s 
proposal. 
If such a situation were to play itself out in Wyoming, and the 
senator were then to leave office, the law would call for the Republican 
Party to nominate three candidates to fill the seat. Such an inequitable 
result is a product of state law, which calls for “the state central 
committee of the political party which the last incumbent represented at 
the time of his election. . .” to nominate three candidates to the 
governor.177 Wyoming law does not adequately take into consideration 
the possibility of a senator changing his or her political party affiliation 
while in office. While such a change in identification is uncommon, it is 
 
169 Democratic Rifts on Health Care, supra note 41; Kane & Murray, supra note 41. 
170 See supra Part V(B). 
171 Paul Kane, Chris Cillizza, & Shailagh Murray, Specter Leaves GOP, Shifting Senate 
Balance, WASH. POST, April 29, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content 
/article/2009/04/28/AR2009042801523.html. 
172 U.S. Congress Votes, supra note 162. 
173 Arlen Specter, Presidential Announcement (Mar. 30, 1995), available at 
http://www.4president.org/speeches/specter1996announcement.htm. 
174 Kane, Cillizza, & Murrary, supra note 171. 
175 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (West 2011). 
176 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-
111(a)(i) (West 2011). 
177 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
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not unprecedented.178 In fact, it has happened three times since 2000.179 
The Hawai’i law would also fail to answer which party should 
nominate three candidates, as it states the governor shall “select [] a 
person from a list of three prospective appointees submitted by the same 
political party as the prior incumbent.”180 When adopting this new law in 
2007, the Hawai’i legislature made the following finding: 
[R]equiring the political party of the prior incumbent to provide the 
governor with a list of qualified nominees from which to choose 
would not unreasonably restrict the pool of qualified candidates for 
the vacancy. Rather, such a process would eliminate skepticism and 
mistrust and increase public trust and confidence in the appurtenant 
process.181 
 
While these are unquestionably legitimate goals that the legislature 
is attempting to reach in its reform, the law would fall short were a 
senator from Hawai’i to switch political parties while in office. Rather 
than ending skepticism and mistrust, the law would invite additional 
drama as political parties fight for the right to nominate three candidates 
for the governor’s consideration. However, all is not lost, as the 
legislature’s goals are achievable by amending the law once more to 
provide for a clear way to identify the former senator’s political party 
affiliation. 
VI. THE IMPRACTICALITY OF IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Changing the State Law 
The problem with changing a state law is that it can be changed 
again, and as such, the reform process can be abused. Headlines were 
made in Massachusetts in 2009, when the state senate reformed its 
Senate succession law by allowing Governor Deval Patrick to appoint a 
replacement during the 145 to 160 days before the statutorily required 
special election.182 As discussed earlier, full representation in the Senate 
 
178 Senators Who Changed Parties During Senate Service (Since 1890), U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/senators_changed_parties.ht
m (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
179 Id. (specifically, James Jeffords (VT), Joseph Lieberman (CT), and Arlen Specter 
(PA)). 
180 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1. 
181 Id. 
182 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 54, § 140(a) (West 2011); Matt Viser, Senate OK’s 
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is important and a state should attempt to fill the vacancy as soon as 
possible.183 Under that theory, the decision by the Massachusetts 
legislature was proper and served an important function. The problem 
arises when the legislative move is viewed in a historical context, which 
shows that it was clearly a misuse of power. 
In 2004, Senator John Kerry (MA) was the Democrat nominee for 
President.184 At the time, Mitt Romney, a Republican, was the Governor 
of Massachusetts.185 Before Senator Kerry won the nomination, the state 
law called for the governor to have unchecked power to fill a vacancy in 
the Senate.186 With a majority in both chambers of the Massachusetts 
Legislature, the Democrats were able to reform the relevant state law, 
requiring the aforementioned special election to occur 145 to 160 days 
after a senator vacates a seat.187 Thus, had Kerry won, the state 
Democrats would have successfully stripped Romney of his 
appointment power. 
Looking at the way the Democrat-majority Massachusetts 
Legislature has reformed the law to their advantage twice in the past 
seven years, it is clear that the lawmakers were motivated by a desire to 
maintain power, rather than a desire to place a check on the governor’s 
decision, or to avoid going underrepresented in Washington. While 
avoiding a shift in the balance of power in the Senate is a legitimate 
goal, the ends fail to justify the means in this situation. Rather, 
Massachusetts lawmakers fostered an environment of illegitimacy and 
mistrust in government, as opposed to constructing a law to combat 
such concerns. 
While there are situations where changing the law would be 
advantageous given the current political circumstances, there are other 
situations where even the best-intentioned reform will be met with 
doubt. Virginia, which is one of the forty states that calls on the 
governor to unconditionally appoint a replacement, is a good example 
 
Kennedy Successor Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2009, at 1. 
183 See supra Part IV(A). 
184 Kerry Accepts Presidential Nomination, CNN (July 30, 2004, 12:56 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/30/fri.hot/index.html. 
185 Biography of Willard Mitt Romney, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/13/AR2007021300497. 
html. 
186 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 54, § 140. 
187 Viser, supra note 182. 
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of this.188 The Old Dominion State is represented in the Senate by Jim 
Webb and Mark Warner, both Democrats.189 On November 3, 2009, 
Robert F. McDonnell, a Republican, was elected Governor.190 Even if a 
well-intentioned Virginia legislator sought to reform the Senate 
succession law over the next four years,191 he or she would be met with 
cynicism. The state’s political climate will always be gauged by the 
legislators and the governor when considering reform, and there are 
likely few, if any, situations where a governor would be willing to cede 
some of his or her power. At the same time, the legislators who belong 
to the same political party as the governor would be unlikely, under 
most circumstances, to be motivated to reform the law. 
B. Constitutional Amendment 
i.  A Difficult Task 
Passing a constitutional amendment would foreclose the 
opportunity for future reform. The problem, however, is the near 
impossibility of getting the amendment ratified. The same problems 
previously raised in getting a law passed in an individual state would be 
magnified thirty-eight times over in the ratification process. 
A constitutional amendment can be proposed by receiving a two-
thirds majority vote in both the United States House of Representatives 
and Senate.192 Even assuming the amendment could get the necessary 
support in Congress — which is in no way guaranteed — it must be 
ratified by thirty-eight state legislatures.193 Considering only three states 
(Wyoming, Utah, and Hawai’i) have analogous state laws,194 it seems 
unlikely that the proposed amendment could gain support of thirty-five 
of the remaining forty-seven states during ratification. If this analysis is 
wrong, and the amendment could gain such support, then it would 
 
188 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-207 (West 1993).  
189 Senators of the 112th Congress, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/general 
/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm?State=VA (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
190 Rosalind S. Helderman & Anita Kumar, GOP Reclaims Virginia, WASH. POST, Nov. 
4, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/11/03/AR2009110 
300371.html. 
191 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-207 (West 2011). 
192 The Constitutional Amendment Process, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov 
/federal-register/constitution/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
193 Id. 
194 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2) 
(West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (West 2011). 
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prevent future abuses of the law. Given that this would cause drastic 
change in the laws governing forty-seven states, however, it seems 
unlikely that an amendment could garner sufficient support to be 
ratified. 
ii.  Senator Feingold’s Proposal 
Former Senator Russ Feingold (WI) agrees that there is a problem 
with the current law employed by more than four-fifths of the states.195 
In the midst of the scandal involving Governor Blagojevich, then-
Senator Feingold opined that “[w]hat we’ve seen this year is a 
disturbing problem and an abuse of this power that suggests this is not 
the way to go about [filling Senate vacancies].”196 To that end, Feingold 
proposed a constitutional amendment that calls for every state to follow 
the model of his home state, Wisconsin,197 and fill a vacant seat in the 
Senate by special election, with no power of appointment vested in the 
governor.198 
It is first worth noting that the former senator is absolutely correct 
in his assessment that there is a problem with the law followed by forty 
states. It is encouraging that a lawmaker recognizes the pitfalls in the 
policy and is taking action to remedy the problem. That being said, 
there are better alternatives than that which Feingold proposes. His 
proposal is an oversimplified answer to the task of finding a law that 
balances all of the concerns with Senate succession laws heretofore 
mentioned. Instead of looking to his own state for guidance on this 
issue, Senator Feingold should have looked westward, to the laws of 
Wyoming, Utah, and Hawai’i.199 By modeling his proposal after the law 
in those three states, Feingold could reach all four goals of a strong 
Senate succession law, as opposed to just three. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Forty states have failed to heed John Dalberg-Acton’s warning,200 
 
195 Emily Friedman, Feingold Seeks Change in Empty Senate Seat Protocol, ABC NEWS 
(Jan. 27, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=6734789. 
196 Id. 
197 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 17.18 (West 2011). 
198 Friedman, supra note 195. 
199 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22-18-111(a)(i). 
200 See DALBERG-ACTON, supra note 1 (“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely”).   
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instead creating an environment where absolute power can corrupt. As 
the legislatures in Wyoming, Utah, and Hawai’i have shown, stripping 
the governor of this absolute power is easily attainable. While these 
states have all achieved successful reform, all three of these state laws 
have potential pitfalls. The law proposed in this Note attempts to close 
these loopholes, while never losing sight of the goals of fairness, 
placing a check on power, full representation, and maintaining 
legitimacy in the process. 
 
